Family control of business is prevalent in developing economies, and one of the leading theories suggests that it is a response to weak contract enforcement in such economies. In this paper, we investigate the impacts of contract enforcement on the degree of family control of business using a sample of China's private enterprises. It is found that weaker contract enforcement is associated with the higher degree of family control of business. Our results are robust to the control for omitted variables and reserve causality issues, to the adjustment for the sample attrition bias, to the use of a sub-sample, and to the inclusion of other explanations for the family control of business.
Introduction
Family control of business is prevalent around the world, and it is especially so in developing economies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000) . 1 One of the leading theoretical explanations focuses on whether family control of business is a response to weak contract enforcement (see Bertrand and Schoar, 2006 , for a review). Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) and Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) point out that while …rm owners may want to recruit professional managers to run their business, they are concerned about the potential expropriation of their properties by professional managers. Alternatively, …rm owners may want to sell their business to outside investors, but such a transfer of assets hinges upon the e¢cient functioning of capital markets. When contract enforcement is problematic, the managerial incentive contracts designed by …rm owners may not have the de facto power in restraining the opportunistic behavior of professional managers. This is further exacerbated by the ine¢cient managerial labor market and the disrespect of …duciary duties that often accompany the weak contract enforcement. Similarly, under weak contract enforcement, capital markets are ine¢cient, making it di¢cult for potential investors to …nance their investment on one hand and secure protection of their investment from expropriation by …rm owners on the other. Taken together, weak contract enforcement leads to a rise of family control of business.
However, empirical evidence regarding the impacts of contract enforcement on family control of business is rather limited. In this paper, we would like to …ll the void by empirically investigating the impacts of contract enforcement on family control of business. Our analysis uses the data of China's privately-owned …rms. Since China started its economic reform in 1978, there has been an explosive growth of private …rms, mostly individually-owned or family-owned ones . Currently, China's nonstate sector accounts for around 65% of its GDP and 70-80% of its GDP growth (CAI JING Magazine, 2007) . Meanwhile, there exist substantial variations in the e¤ectiveness of the de facto contract enforcement across regions despite the fact that China is a unitary state with uniform legal codes (e.g., Du, Lu and Tao, 2008a; World Bank, 2008) . Thus, China o¤ers an ideal setting to investigate the impacts of contract enforcement on family control of business.
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Following the literature on family …rms (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Amit, 2006, 2007) , we measure the degree of family control of business as the extent to which …rm owners make important management decisions such as operations, wages and bene…ts, human resource management, and long-term corporate decisions. And we measure the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement as the willingness of private …rms to use courts to resolve business disputes (e.g., North, 1991; Cull and Xu, 2005) .
Our ordinary least squares regression results show that the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement has a negative and statistically signi…cant impact on the degree of family control of business, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) and Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) .
This result, however, could be biased due to some omitted variables and reverse causality issues. We then control for a host of variables related to …rm and …rm owner's characteristics, region characteristics, and industry dummies, and …nd that our results are robust to these controls. To alleviate the concern of reverse causality, we use the regional average of other …rms' perceptions regarding the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement, and …nd that our results still hold. To further address potential endogeneity problems, we use the instrumental variable method. Following La Vishny (1997, 1998) , we use legal origin (i.e., an indicator of whether a region was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty) as an instrument for contract enforcement. The instrumental variable estimation results show that weaker contract enforcement causes …rms to be more family-controlled.
The validity of our instrumental variable estimation hinges upon the satisfaction of two conditions: the relevance condition and the exclusion restriction. The relevance condition is con…rmed by the highly signi…cant correlation between the instrumental variable and the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement, and by the result of the Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic. Meanwhile, the large Shea partial R-squared and the Cragg-Donald 2 Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting the linkage between poor contract enforcement and the prevalence of family control of business in China. There are many examples indicating that …rm owners and professional managers have disputes about incentive payments agreed upon ex ante, resulting in the departure of professional managers in the middle of their contracts (Li, 2006) . Even worse, there are cases where the professional managers hired by family …rms breach their employment contracts by taking away clienteles and setting up competing businesses (Dai, 2007) . In general, the ful…llment of the …duciary duties of professional managers is a big concern to …rm owners, especially in the less developed regions of China.
F-statistic rule out the concern for the weak instrumental variable. With regard to the exclusion restriction, we conduct a test following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) . Speci…cally, if the instrumental variable affects the degree of family control of business only through the channel of contract enforcement, then the instrumental variable should not have any statistically signi…cant impact when it is included together with the contract enforcement index in the regressions. Our results remain robust with this exclusion test, implying that our instrumental variable estimation is valid.
For further robustness checks, we use an alternative instrumental variable, adopt two methods to investigate if our results are biased due to the sample attrition problem, focus on a sub-sample of …rms with their main owners having 100% equity shares, and …nally control for three alternative explanations for the family control of business.
Our study is related to the recent literature on the importance of economic institutions for economic growth (e.g., Robinson, 2001, 2002) , incentives for investment (e.g., Besley, 1995; Johnson, McMillan, and Woodru¤, 2002) , and corporate decisions (e.g., Laeven and Woodru¤, 2007; Du, Lu, and Tao, 2008b) .
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and variables for the empirical study, while Section 3 presents our main empirical results. The paper concludes with Section 4.
Data and Variables
The data set used in this study is from the Survey of China's Private Enterprises conducted in 2002. This survey is conducted jointly by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, and the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. To achieve a balanced representation across all regions and industries in China, the survey uses the multi-stage strati…ed random sampling method. The total number of private …rms to be surveyed is …rst determined. After this, six cities/counties are selected from each of the 31 regions (i.e., 22 provinces, 4 province-level municipalities, and 5 minority autonomous regions), which include the capital city of the region, one prefecture-level city, one county-level city, and three counties. Next, the number of private …rms to be surveyed in each region is determined by the product of the percentage of the region's share of private …rms in the national total and the total number of private …rms in the survey. The same method is used to determine the number of sample …rms in every city/county and industry. Finally, private …rms are randomly chosen for each sub-sample. The data set contains 3,258 initial observations, which represents 0.16% of the total number of privately-owned …rms nationwide by the end of 2001.
The dependent variables of this study are about the degree of family control of business. In the survey, there are four questions related to the degree of family control, (i) who makes the operations decisions, (ii) who makes decisions on wages and bene…ts for the employees, (iii) who makes the human resource management decisions, and (iv) whether …rm owner or his relatives are required for the long-term development of the …rm. 3 The possible answers for the …rst three questions are, the …rm owner himself, the board of directors, the …rm owner and the senior management, the …rm owner and other organizations, the management, and others. We construct three dummy variables, Operations Decisions, Wages and Bene…ts, and HRM Decisions, corresponding to the …rst three questions, taking a value of 1 if the reply is "the …rm owner himself" and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, a dummy variable, Long-term Development, is constructed corresponding to the fourth question, taking a value of 1 if the reply is a¢rmative and 0 otherwise.
To have comprehensive characterizations of family control of business, we use the principal component and the simple average of the four variables discussed above, and construct two variables (Family Control_pc and Family Control_average) accordingly. The correlations of the four component measures of family control as well as the two comprehensive measures of family control are shown in Table 1 . Table 2 shows the pattern of family control of business in China. 4 Clearly, there are signi…cant variations in each of the four component measures of family control of business across China's regions. For the variable Operations Decisions, Hainan has the highest degree of family control (with a mean value of 0.674), followed by Liaoning (0.616) and Yunnan (0.521), whereas Beijing has the lowest degree of family control (0.228), followed by Jilin (0.276) and Chongqing (0.286). Meanwhile, Liaoning has the highest percentage of …rm owners making decisions on Wages and Bene…ts (0.598), followed by Hainan (0.533) and Shanxi (0.500), whereas Hubei has the lowest percentage (0.183), followed by Beijing (0.186) and Chongqing (0.196) . As for HRM Decisions, Liaoning has the highest degree of family control (0.640), followed by Shanxi (0.560) and Hainan (0.543), whereas Chongqing has the lowest degree (0.232), followed by Beijing (0.236) and Hubei (0.274). For the variable Long-term Development, Hainan has the highest percentage of family control (0.630), followed by Xinjiang (0.521) and Yunnan (0.500), whereas Jiangxi has the lowest percentage (0.211), followed by Gansu (0.241) and Chongqing (0.250). Referring to the comprehensive measures of family control (i.e., Family Control_pc and Family Control_average), Liaoning, Hainan, and Yunnan are the three regions with the highest degree of family control of business, whereas Beijing, Chongqing, and Hubei are the three regions with the lowest degree.
Meanwhile, there are signi…cant variations in the degree of family control of business across …rms in terms of both size and age, with larger and older …rms having lower degrees of family control. Finally, the last row of Table 2 shows that the percentage of …rm owners involved in the decision on Wages and Bene…ts is the lowest (0.351) among the four component measures of family control of business, whereas the percentage of Operations Decisions is the highest (0.402).
Our key independent variable is the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. In the survey, there is a question on whether a …rm would like to use courts to resolve business disputes. A variable denoted by Contract Enforcement is constructed accordingly, taking a value of 1 if the reply is a¢rmative and 0 otherwise. Note that only 862 out of 3,258 …rms responded to this question, thereby reducing the sample size in our regression analysis. Table 3 shows the pattern of family control of business in China in the regression sample, which are similar to those of the full sample reported in Table 2 . Moreover, in the regression analysis, using two methodologies à la Du ‡o (2001) and Wooldridge (2002 Wooldridge ( , 2007 , we will con…rm that our results are not biased due to the sample attrition with regard to the mis-reporting of contract enforcement.
It is important to note that there are signi…cant variations in the e¤ec-tiveness of contract enforcement across China's region despite China being a unitary state with uniform laws and national ordinances. The mean value of Contract Enforcement is 0.860 with a standard deviation of 0.348 in our sample.
O¢cially, China has a centralized legal structure, with the National People's Congress (NPC) having the sole power to enact laws and national ordinances. However, due to substantial variations in endowments, socioeconomic development, and culture across regions as well as the fast-changing socioeconomic environment as experienced during China's economic transition, the laws and national ordinances enacted by the NPC tend to be sketchy and need to be modi…ed in order to be more applicable to local circumstances (Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser, 2000) . Meanwhile, the legal system in China comprises of four levels of courts: the Supreme People's Court at the national level, the Higher Level People's Courts at the regional level, and the Intermediate Level and Basic Level People's Courts at the local level. Despite the system's self-image as one in which courts only apply law and national ordinances, all these four levels of courts are capable of issuing rules and regulations purporting to be binding on various parties to varying degrees (e.g., Chen, 2004; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2005) .
In issuing rules and regulations with respect to laws and national ordinances, however, local courts (i.e., Higher Level, Intermediate Level, and Basic Level People's Courts) are vulnerable to the in ‡uences of respective local governments, and they are pressured to make rulings in favor of local …rms and industries in lawsuits, which involves parties outside local jurisdictions (e.g., Zheng, 1988; Shi, 1989) . This is because the power to appoint and dismiss court personnel is lodged in the local People's Congress, and local courts rely on local governments for their …nance (Zhao, Zhou, Zhang, Qi, and Wang, 1989) . Meanwhile, as local courts are short of autonomous enforcement powers in China, the enforcement of rulings, especially those against local …rms and industries, hinges upon the cooperation of local authorities such as local public security bureaus (e.g., Fan, 1985; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Zhao, 1989; Li, Zhang, and Wang, 1990; Clarke, 1991) . As a result, there are substantial variations in the interpretation and enforcement of laws and national ordinances enacted by the central government across China's various regions (e.g., Tai, 1957; Cheng, Liu and Cheng, 1982; Yearbook of People's Court, 1990; Clarke, 1996 Clarke, , 2005 . Indeed, a World Bank survey conducted in 2008 reveals substantial di¤erences in the e¢ciency of courts to resolve business disputes across China's regions. For example, in coastal cities, it takes an average of 230 days to resolve an uncomplicated commercial dispute, whereas the corresponding number for Northeastern China is 363 days (World Bank, 2008) .
In the empirical analysis, we also control for other factors that might possibly a¤ect the degree of family control of business, including …rm and …rm owner's characteristics, regional characteristics, and industry dummies. The …rm characteristics include Firm Size (measured by the logarithm of total sales) and Firm Age (measured by the logarithm of years of establishment by the end of 2001). The …rm owner's characteristics include his human capital, Education (years of formal schooling), Age (the age of the …rm owner by the end of 2001), and Gender (a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the …rm owner is a male and 0 otherwise); and his political capital, CPC Membership (a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the …rm owner is a member of the Chinese People's Congress and 0 otherwise) and CPPCC Membership (a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the …rm owner is a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and 0 otherwise). Finally, we included industry dummy and the logarithm of regional GDP per capita to account for the possible di¤erences in the degree of family control of business across industries and regions.
As a way of controlling for the problem of reverse causality, for each …rm, we use the regional average of other …rms' perceptions on the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. To further address potential endogeneity issues, we follow the literature (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997 Vishny, , 1998 ) and use legal origin as an instrumental variable for the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. Speci…cally, it is a dummy variable (denoted by British Administration) indicating whether the respective region was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty (details will be provided below in Section 3.4). Finally, to examine other possible explanations for the degree of family control of business, we construct three variables: Entrepreneurship of Family Members (the fraction of the …rm owner's grandfather, father, mother, and spouse being self-employed), Diversi…cation (a categorical variable taking a value of 0 if the …rm engages in only one business, a value of 1 if the …rm engages in two businesses, a value of 2 if the …rm engages in three businesses, and a value of 3 if the …rm engages in four businesses), and Di¢cult to Find Reliable Managers (a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the answer to the Survey question "whether it is di¢cult for …rm owner to …nd reliable professional managers" is a¢rmative and 0 otherwise).
The summary statistics of all key variables are given in Table 4 .
3 Empirical Analysis
Benchmark Results
To investigate the impacts of the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement on the degree of family control of business, we estimate the following equation:
where y f measures the degree of family control of business for …rm f in region r and industry i, Contract Enf orcement f is the perception regarding the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement by …rm f in region r and industry i, i is the industry dummy, X f is a vector of control variables, and " f is a random error term. To deal with the possible heteroskedasticity, standard errors are clustered at the industry/region level.
The benchmark estimation results with both industry dummies and the logarithm of GDP per capita included are presented in Table 5 . are the Probit regression results for the four component measures of family control of business: Operations Decisions, Wages and Bene…ts, HRM Decisions, and Long-term Development. Clearly, the degree of family control of business along with each of these four dimensions is negatively and statistically signi…cantly correlated with the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. As shown in Columns 5-6 of Table 5 , similar results are found for the two comprehensive measures of family control of business: Family Control_pc (principal component of the four component measures) and Family Control_average (simple average of the four component measures). Speci…cally, a one-standard-deviation increase in the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement leads to a 0.153-standard-deviation decrease in Family Control_pc and a 0.159-standard-deviation decrease in Family Control_average.
Multivariate Analysis
The above benchmark regression results could be biased due to the lack of control for omitted variables and reverse causality issues. In Table 6 , we control for a host of variables related to …rm and …rm owner's characteristics.
Columns 1-2 of Table 6 report the results for Family Control_pc when the …rm owner's and …rm characteristics are added stepwise along with industry dummies and the logarithm of GDP per capita. To deal with the concern that the results could still be biased due to the cross-regional variations in industrial structure, in Column 3, we use the industry/region dummies instead of industry dummies and the logarithm of GDP per capita. 5 In Columns 4-5, we repeat the analysis in Columns 2-3 using Family Control_average as a measure of the degree of family control of business. Clearly, our previous results on the negative correlation between the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement and the degree of family control of business remain robust to these controls. Meanwhile, the estimated coe¢cients of control variables also make economic sense. For example, …rm owners with better education prefer to have less family control of their businesses, larger …rms are less likely to be family controlled, and …rms located in more developed regions have lower degrees of the family control of business.
Region-Level Analysis
To alleviate the concern of reverse causality, for each …rm, we use the regional average of other …rms' perceptions on the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement as the explanatory variable, and repeat the estimations. As shown in Table 7 , …rms in regions with weaker contract enforcement are found to have higher degrees of family control.
Instrumental Variable Estimation
It could still be argued that endogeneity issues remain. For example, we may not exhaust all possible variables that correlate with both the degree of family control of business and the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. Meanwhile, …rms with higher degrees of family control rely more on their family reputations for doing business with other …rms, thus having less need for improvements of e¤ective contract enforcement in their regions.
To further deal with these endogeneity problems, we use the instrumental variable estimation as a robustness check. Motivated by the recent literature on economic institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997 and Robinson, 2001, 2002) , we look back into the Chinese history for suitable instruments. Speci…cally, we use a dummy variable indicating whether the respective region was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty as an instrument for the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. We compile historical information on the control of China's regions by foreign powers from relevant texts on the modern history of China such as the works of McAleavy (1967) and Dong, Zhang, and Jiao (2000) .
During the late Qing Dynasty (1840-1911), China was defeated in a series of wars against foreign powers, including two Opium Wars with Great Britain, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the Boxer Rebellion. In the wake of military defeats, the Qing government was forced to sign unequal treaties including territorial concessions. The wave of territorial partitioning climaxed at the end of the 19th century, with Great Britain governing regions along the Yangtze River (Guizhou, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangxu, Henan, and Zhejiang), France governing Yunnan, Hainan, Guangxi, and the majority of Guangdong, Germany governing Shandong, Japan governing Fujian, and Russia governing Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the three north-eastern provinces (Qian, 1948) . Shanghai and Tianjin, the two leading commercial centers of China at that time, were divided into various foreign concessions.
Within their respective domains of control, the foreign powers e¤ectively established their sovereign authorities (McAleavy, 1967) . Typically, the foreign powers imposed their own civil and military administration, including in partically their own legal systems (Dong, Zhang, and Jiao 2000) . As a result, law suits taking place in the domains controlled by the foreign powers were adjudicated using the legal systems of the respective reigning foreign powers (e.g., Yang and Ye, 1993; Tan, 1996) . The foreign powers imposed their legal systems by force, and hence the legal systems could be considered as exogenous to the local community. The foreign powers had di¤erent legal systems, with Great Britain using the common law system and France, Germany, Japan, and Russia adopting the civil law system. It has been shown that the common law system supports private market outcomes while the civil law system imposes state-desired allocations, implying di¤erent types of social control of business (Damaška, 1986; Pistor, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008) . As a result, the common law system is associated with greater judicial independence (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, Pop-Eleches, and Shleifer, 2004), less formalism of judicial procedures (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003) and fewer judicial biases (Gennaioli, 2009 ) than the civil law system, which in turn leads to more e¤ective contract enforcement under the common law system than that under the civil law system (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008) .
The imposition of the legal systems by the foreign powers in various parts of China in the late Qing Dynasty was expected to in ‡uence not only the legal rules, but also the legal institutions (including judicial independence and legal procedures), and human capital and beliefs of the key participants in the legal systems (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008) . Indeed, the foreign powers in China were actively engaged in transplanting and cultivating their beliefs and ideologies to the local people by setting up and operating schools and colleges. Speaking at the Second Protestantism Propagators Congress held in Shanghai in China in 1890, F.L. Hawks Pott, President of Saint John's University, declared that "in our school, we trained China's future teachers and propagators, making them the leaders and comperes in the future and casting the greatest in ‡uences on the future China" (Yang and Ye 1993).
The legal institutions, human capital and beliefs that were transplanted and cultivated by di¤erent foreign powers are expected to persist over time (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998; Balas, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2009) . Indeed, there is a growing body of literature on the persistence of culture, beliefs, and ideologies over time (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Dohmen, Falk, Hu¤man, and Sunde, 2006; Tabellini, 2007a Tabellini, , 2007b Tabellini, , 2008 .
Given that the contract enforcement is more e¤ective under the common law system used by Great Britain than under the civil law system used by France, Germany, Japan, and Russia, we therefore take whether a region of China was administered by Great Britain during the late Qing Dynasty as a reasonable instrument for the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement in 2001.
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The instrumental variable estimation results are summarized in Table  8 . As shown in Panel B, the instrumental variable (British Administration) is positively and statistically signi…cantly correlated with the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement, which is consistent with our above argument of the relevance on the instrumental variable. Columns 1-2 in Panel A report the second-stage estimation results, when Family Control_pc and Family Control_average are used as the dependent variable, respectively. The results reinforce our earlier …ndings and show that weaker contract enforcement causes …rms to be more family-controlled.
The validity of our instrumental variable estimation hinges upon the satisfaction of the relevance condition and the exclusion restriction. The relevance condition is con…rmed by the highly signi…cant correlation between the instrumental variable and the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement (Panel B of Table 8 ), and the result of the Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic (Panel C of Table 8 ). Meanwhile, the concern for the weak instrument is ruled out by the large Shea partial R-squared and the result of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic (Panel C of Table 8 ).
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With regard to the exclusion restriction (i.e., the instrument variable does not a¤ect family control of business through channels other than contract enforcement), we carry out a test following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) . This test is based on the premise that if the instrumental variable a¤ects family control of business only through contract enforcement, then the instrumental variable should not have any signi…cant impact on family control of business conditional on the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. Indeed, as shown in Columns 3-4 of Table 8, the instrumental variable has a negative and signi…cant impact on family control of business when it is used as the explanatory variable, but its signi…cance disappears when Contract Enforcement is included as an additional explanatory variable.
For a further robustness check, we use an alternative instrumental variable. Speci…cally, we take the view that the e¤ectiveness of contract en- 6 The classi…cation of the legal origin for Shanghai and Tianjin requires some extra care because these two municipalities were occupied by several foreign powers. As over 60% of Shanghai's territories were occupied by Great Britain, it is classi…ed to be administrated by Great Britain. Tianjin, however, is classi…ed to be not administrated by Great Britain because only about 20% of its territories were occupied by Great Britain.
7 The Cragg-Donald F-statistic values for our regressions are signi…cantly above the value of 10, which is considered as the critical value by Staiger and Stock (1997) .
forcement perceived by a …rm is comprised of two components, a regional component and a …rm-speci…c component. The …rst component is common to all …rms located in the same region, while the second component captures the idiosyncratic factors speci…c to each …rm. More importantly, since the regional component of contract enforcement is determined by the underlying factors at the regional level, such as the behavior of local government o¢-cials and the capability of local judges, it is thus exogenous to the …rm. This enables us to use the regional average of other …rms' perceptions on the effectiveness of contract enforcement as an instrument. 8 As shown in Column 5 of Table 8 , our main results are robust to this alternative instrumental variable estimation.
Overall, our instrumental variable estimation results show that the e¤ec-tiveness of contract enforcement has a negative and signi…cant causal e¤ect on the degree of family control of business.
Robustness Checks
Recall that there is a substantial attrition in sample size because a lot of …rms do not answer the question regarding the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. This may raise the concern that our estimation results could be biased due to this sample attrition problem, that is, …rms that answer the question could be di¤erent from those that do not. 9 To address this possible concern, we use two recently developed methodologies on sample attrition bias. First, following Du ‡o (2001), we estimate the propensity of a …rm to answer the survey question regarding contract enforcement based on …rm and …rm owner's characteristics, and then include the polynomial terms of the propensity in the main speci…cation. Second, we use the inverse-probabilityweighted (IPW) method developed by Wooldridge (2002 Wooldridge ( , 2007 , in which the inverse of the estimated propensity is used as the sample weight in the main speci…cation. The estimation results using these two methods (reported in Table 9 ) show that contract enforcement still has a negative and statistically signi…cant impact on the degree of family control of business, thereby ruling out the concern of sample attrition bias.
Next, we restrict our analysis to the subsample of …rms, the main owner of which has 100% share of the …rm. Firm owners in this subsample presumably worry more about the expropriation of their properties by professional managers and face greater di¢culties in selling their companies to outside investors. The results are shown in Table 10 , where Family Control_pc and Family Control_average are used as the dependent variable in Columns 1-2, respectively. Clearly, our results are robust to this subsample.
For further robustness checks, we control for explanations for family control of business other than the contract enforcement argument. One hypothesis is that …rm owners may have innate capabilities for running business, and hence are more likely to have family control of business (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . A proxy for such innate capabilities of …rm owners is the entrepreneurship of their family members.
10 Meanwhile, it has been argued that …rms with a greater need for external …nance may have to sell their shares to outside investors, thereby diluting their family control of business (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003) . A proxy for the need for external …nance is the degree of corporate diversi…cation (i.e., the number of business segments). Moreover, in developing countries such as China where the managerial labor market is underdeveloped, …rm owners may encounter di¢culties in identifying and retaining reliable professional managers, hence the high degree of family control of business.
To control for these alternative explanations for family control of business, we include Entrepreneurship of Family Members (the fraction of the …rm owner's grandfather, father, mother, and spouse being self-employed), Diversi…cation (the number of business segments), and Di¢cult to Find Reliable Managers (an indicator of di¢culty in …nding reliable professional managers) individually and collectively, and report the regression results in Table  11 . It is found that Contract Enforcement always has a negative and statistically signi…cant impact on the degree of family control of business. Of the three alternative explanations for the family control of business, we …nd support for Diversi…cation and Di¢cult to Find Reliable Managers, but not Entrepreneurship of Family Members.
Conclusion
Family control of business is a widely-observed phenomenon in developing economies. One of the leading theories suggests that it is a response to weak contract enforcement in such economies (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2005) . However, empirical evidence on the relevance of this theory remains limited.
In this paper, using a sample of China's private …rms, we investigate the impacts of contract enforcement on the degree of family control of business.
We …nd that weaker contract enforcement is associated with a higher degree of family control of business. To alleviate the concern that our results could be biased due to omitted variables and reverse causality, we experiment with a host of control variables and a regional level measure of the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement, and …nd that our results are robust. Furthermore, we use the instrumental variable estimation to deal with the possible endogeneity problems, and establish that weaker contract enforcement causes …rms to be more family-controlled. The results of this study highlight the importance of economic institutions on corporate decisions in developing economies. t-values, clustered at the industry/region level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. The first stages of TSLS have the same controls as those in the second stage of TSLS but their results are not reported to save space (available upon request). 
